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Abstract
Groundwater can be considered as a common-pool resource, is often
overexploited and, as a result, there are growing management pressures. This
chapter starts with a broad presentation of the range of economic instruments
that can be used for groundwater management, considering current practices and
innovative approaches inspired from the literature on Common Pool Resources
management. It then goes on with a detailed presentation of groundwater
allocation policies implemented in France, the High Plains aquifer in the USA,
and Chile. The chapter concludes with a discussion of social and political
difficulties associated with implementing economic instruments for groundwater
management.
22.1 Introduction
As detailed in Chap. 2 and elsewhere in this book, groundwater abstraction has
increased considerably over the last few decades for both agricultural and urban
uses. In many parts of the world, government agencies have not paid sufficient
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attention to this ‘silent revolution’. Groundwater development has thus taken place
in an institutional setting that placed no or few limits on groundwater use. Tens of
thousands of wells and boreholes were constructed by small private agricultural or
urban economic actors, leading to overdraft and associated environmental impacts
(e.g. sea water intrusion, declining water tables, impacts on dependent ecosystems).
In countries where groundwater has long been considered as an open access good,
the establishment of new rules for governing access to groundwater and its use is
increasingly perceived as necessary. This calls for the design of innovative institu-
tional frameworks, involving the redistribution of responsibilities between the State
and user communities, and an increased use of economic instruments providing
incentives and theoretically leading to higher water use efficiency.
In practice, the shift from an open access to a regulated use regime has been
implemented with three distinct policy approaches, depending on the local or
national economic, legal and social context. The first approach (command and
control) consists of establishing or reinforcing direct administrative regulation,
with systematic registration of abstraction points, the issuance of pumping permits,
and the award and enforcement of individual volumetric quotas. This approach is
illustrated by the case of France, described in detail in Sect. 22.3 of this chapter. The
second approach is founded on private appropriation of the resource, and involves
the allocation of water use rights (the nature of which can differ significantly from
one country to another) which can be traded amongst users, under supervision of a
State agency. Such groundwater markets exist in several countries including the
USA, Chile (see Sects. 22.4 and 22.5 of this chapter), Australia (Skurray
et al. 2012), China (Zhang et al. 2008) and Spain (Garrido et al. 2012), among
others. The third approach is founded on the decentralization of water allocation
policies and the devolution of a number of State responsibilities to Water Users
Communities or Associations. This model has been implemented with varying level
of success in Spain or Mexico (Mukherji and Shah 2005), and underlies the recent
evolution of groundwater policy in France.
In each of these three policy approaches, water managers are dealing with
similar issues, including: the definition of the nature of water use rights; the control
of free riding behaviors and the access to information on abstraction points and
actual water withdrawals. In the following sections, we illustrate how these issues
have been addressed in three different contexts in France, the USA and Chile. We
also describe existing economic instruments and innovative ones that could be
implemented to control access to and the use of groundwater.
The chapter is organized as follows. It starts with a broad presentation of the
range of economic instruments that can be used for groundwater management,
considering current practices and innovative approaches inspired from the literature
on Common Pool Resources management (Sect. 22.2). The chapter then goes on
with a detailed presentation of groundwater allocation policies implemented in
France (Sect. 22.3), the High Plains Aquifer in the USA (Sect. 22.4), and Chile
(Sect. 22.5). The chapter ends with a discussion of social and political difficulties
associated with implementing economic instruments for groundwater management.
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22.2 Economic Instruments for Groundwater Management:
Approaches and Challenges
Since the 1980s, there has been a growing recognition that economic instruments
should be used to regulate the access to and the use of water resources. However, a
review of existing practices shows that situations resembling Hardin’s tragedy of
the commons still prevail in most places around the world (see Chap. 23). This
situation reflects the significant difficulties encountered by policy makers and
managers to deploy economic instruments, in particular due to the lack of informa-
tion on water users, abstraction points and water withdrawals, as well as the
difficulties in enforcing allocation rules and instruments. This first part of the
chapter proposes to look at existing and innovative tools that are, or could be,
deployed to ensure sustainable management of overexploited aquifers.
22.2.1 The Information Problem
One of the main challenges faced by water managers attempting to control ground-
water use is the lack of information regarding the hydrology of the aquifer and the
abstractions. More specifically, well developed and calibrated models are not
usually available, which does not facilitate estimation of the stock and recharge
levels. In Chile, for example, there is little to no knowledge of the aquifers south of
Central Chile. Moreover, the number of abstraction points, their location, the
average volume pumped and the period at which the pumping takes place are
often unknown. Indeed, the control of groundwater – a three-dimensional system
– is more complex than for surface systems (one-dimension). The existence of
undeclared or illegal wells remains an issue even in developed countries, both in the
urban and agricultural sectors. When abstraction points are known, meters are not
always installed or they can be temporarily removed or tampered with. This is
illustrated with several agricultural and urban case studies selected in southern
Europe such as in Spain or in France (de Stefano and Lopez-Gunn 2012;
Montginoul and Rinaudo 2011), and elsewhere in the world.
In such contexts, groundwater abstraction control policies have focused on
circumventing the monitoring problem by using readily observable information
that can be used as a proxy for groundwater abstraction. Four different levels of
information can be targeted depending on the effort made.
– On the first level, the agency decides to rely on aggregate information which
provides a proxy for the overall groundwater abstraction – for instance the
measurement of groundwater table levels. A decline of water table (adjusted
considering climatic conditions) indicates an increase of water abstraction and
can trigger temporary bans on irrigation, for instance. Sophisticated groundwater
models can also be used to assess total abstraction with better accuracy.
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– The second level consists of identifying and locating all abstraction points and
users. This can be done in a deterministic way (through field surveys for
instance) or based on self-declaration.
– This information can be improved (third level) by collecting technical informa-
tion on the characteristics of the wells (pump capacity), on irrigated areas and
type of crops grown by farmers and on the type of irrigation system used (drip or
furrow irrigation). Rough estimates of individual abstraction can then be derived
from this information.
– The fourth level of information is when water use is fully metered, the agency
knowing who uses how much water in which place at different periods of
the year.
22.2.1.1 Current Policies
Policies currently implemented by groundwater management agencies to reveal
groundwater use information mostly rely on command and control mechanisms.
The most frequently used approach relies on random control and penalties. Two
main constraints usually limit the efficiency of this type of system: first, the agency
often lacks the required human resources to inspect a significant proportion of
users; second, fines imposed are kept low for political reasons. Overall, the risk of
running an illegal well or under-declaring water abstraction is perceived as very
limited by users who are facing little incentives to comply with the regulatory
framework (cost of non-compliance is lower than cost of compliance). The effi-
ciency of the inspection and sanction system can however be improved in several
ways. The first one consists of increasing inspection probability or the fine for users
who were caught in fraud. The second one could consist of providing incentives for
all users getting involved in the monitoring of groundwater abstraction, in order to
increase the probability of control. The cost of decentralized monitoring is expected
to be lower, since agents possess information on the actions of other agents (areas
and crops irrigated, irrigation practices and frequencies, etc.). The incentive to
participate in a decentralized monitoring system can be provided by redistributing a
share of the fine to the person who discovers the violator. This system has been used
for centuries for regulating access to common pastures and forests in the Italian
Alps (Casari and Plott 2003). It may however be strongly assimilated to denounce-
ment and thus rejected in many cultural contexts.
The second policy approach, mainly used in the agricultural sector, consists of
assessing individual water abstractions through indirect information, such as the
observation of cropping patterns with satellite images (Casta~no et al. 2010) or
electricity bills (when wells are electric-powered). An illustration can be found in
Mancha Oriental (Spain), where a groundwater user association (Junta Central de
Regantes de la Mancha Oriental) uses satellite images to assess monthly ground-
water use for each individual farmer. If the estimated water abstraction exceeds the
quota allocated to the farmer (4000 m3/ha), a field inspection is carried out and a
fine is charged to the farmer in the case of non-compliance (Martin de Santa Olalla
et al. 1999, 2003).
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Desprats et al. (2011) suggested that a similar approach could be used to identify
unlicensed urban groundwater users. This would apply to low density urban areas
where households use private wells for watering lawns and gardens and filling
swimming pools. Their method consists of using high resolution aerial photographs
to assess irrigated lawn areas and swimming pools and to compute the
corresponding outdoor water use for each single family house. They then compare
estimated outdoor water requirements with metered water bills to identify
households using private wells. The method is applied to a southern France case
study to detect undeclared domestic boreholes.
Another way to incentivise users to reveal more accurate information is the
charging of a high flat rate when users refuse to declare information on abstraction.
This is actually used by the Rhoˆne Water Agency in France, which charges high
irrigation water fees on a per hectare basis (crop differentiated) to farmers who
refuse to meter water abstraction. However, in spite of the economic incentives,
some farmers prefer paying high charges for preserving the information asymmetry,
fearing that water fees may rise in the future once meters have been installed
everywhere. This echoes the “ratchet principle” enunciated by Weitzman (1980):
economic agents may refuse higher rewards for better current performance by fear
of future assignment of more ambitious targets.
A fourth policy approach comprises linking groundwater management with
other economic policies. In Europe for instance, the grant of subsidies under
Common Agricultural Policies is conditioned by full compliance with environmen-
tal regulations (eco-conditionality). This compels farmers to declare their wells to
the relevant authorities and to demonstrate that appropriate metering devices are
installed. Similar constraints are imposed on farmers by supermarkets through the
use of certification standards (e.g. Global Gap) which aim at providing consumers
the security that the products they purchase have been produced in conformity with
existing environmental regulations.
22.2.1.2 Alternative Policy Options Based on Incentives
Several other proposed instruments have been suggested in the Common Pool
Resources literature to force users to reveal information on harvesting level.
Although none of them have been applied to groundwater management, they can
theoretically be considered as possible options worth being assessed in terms of
efficiency, equity and acceptability.
One of these theoretical options involves combining an upfront payment with
compliance rebate. The mechanism is inspired from the “guilty until proven
innocent” principle enunciated by Swierzbinski (1994) in his work on pollution
control. Applied to groundwater abstraction, it could work as follows. Every user is
requested to declare what his groundwater abstraction is (self-reporting principle)
and he pays an initial fee or tax that depends on what he reports. The agency in
charge then conducts random inspections and quantifies actual water abstraction,
based on costly audit. In the case of proven non-compliance, the user is punished
with a dissuasive fine; if findings of the audit are consistent with the initial
declaration, the user is rewarded with a rebate. Auditing probability is inversely
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correlated to the declared intensity of groundwater use (in m3 per hectare for
instance). The relative values of the fine and of the rebate determine on which of
the two mechanisms (sanction or reward) the incentive structure depends.
A variant of this instrument can be proposed if we assume that the audit cost can
be lowered through active cooperation of the user (e.g. weekly on-line recording of
water uses). In that case, voluntary agreements could be signed between users
willing to be audited and the regulator. The main advantage of this system is that
it shifts the burden of proof from the regulator to the user. This mechanism is
similar to deposit-refund systems which have been advocated to control other
environmental problems.
22.2.2 Instruments for Groundwater Abstraction Control
Based on Salzman’s classification, five instruments can be used to control ground-
water abstraction (Salzman 2005): (1) command and control; (2) penalty (including
tax); (3) payment (including subsidies); (4) appropriation (tradable property rights);
and (5) persuasion. Some of them are incentive-based instruments (2-3-4), others
aim to manage groundwater abstraction through an administrative or concerted
share of available water, or through influencing withdrawers taking into account
psychological and social aspects. Although this chapter is primarily dedicated to
economic instruments, these five instruments are presented here because they can
be combined to increase the efficiency of incentive-based instruments or are in
competition.
22.2.2.1 Command and Control
The command and control approach relies on the definition of restrictions of use
that can take different forms depending of the level of available information. When
abstraction points are known and water uses fully metered, a system of individual
abstraction quotas can be implemented. Quotas can be adjusted every year to
account for variability of groundwater recharge. Enforcement requires a system
of control (meter reading) which can be costly. This allocation procedure is a source
of economic inefficiency, quotas being frequently allocated based on historical
records. More simple restriction approaches are used when information is lacking,
such as a temporary ban on irrigation when groundwater levels fall below certain
pre-specified threshold level. An intermediate approach lies in restricting the
pumping capacity of users while granting pumping licenses. Water abstraction
can also be controlled through rationing energy used for pumping, a current practice
in several Indian States (Shah 2008). An alternative is non-tradable water rights
(water use rights) that specify maximum allowable extraction water flows for each
abstraction point. The advantage of this command and control instrument is that it
allows the taking into account of geographical differences in water abstraction
levels for the same aquifer. As with the quota system, non-tradable water rights
require a costly system of control. Chile’s 1951 Water Code (Ley 9909, 1951)
employed this instrument.
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22.2.2.2 Abstraction Tax Systems
The tax approach assumes that consumption (households) or production decisions
(farmers) can be influenced by the cost of water supply. The type of tax system that
can be implemented again depends on the level of information available to the
regulator.
If water abstraction is metered, an individual (Pigouvian) tax system can be
used. The tax can also be levied on inputs used for pumping such as electricity. In
both cases, the choice of an efficient tax level is not trivial, in particular where
demand and available resource significantly fluctuate over time. If the tax level is
set to ensure that no over-exploitation takes place in a normal climatic year, it will
not allow meeting this objective in drought years, when farmer’s willingness to pay
for water is extremely high. If on the contrary, the tax level is set taking drought
years into consideration, it will represent an unacceptable economic burden for
farms during normal years. The choice of an efficient tax level is further compli-
cated by conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, farmers’ decisions to use one
or the other resource being influenced by the relative level of taxes charged for the
two different resources (Lenouvel and Montginoul 2010).
If abstraction points are unknown or if water use is unmetered, the regulator can
charge all actors using groundwater with an ambient tax with level proportional to
the aggregate over-exploitation level (Segerson 1988). The regulator can assess the
aggregate abstraction level based on simple observation of groundwater level
decline, or use more sophisticated groundwater models that account for climatic
and other natural recharge conditions. Each user is then charged with the same tax
level, irrespective of his or her actual groundwater use. To cope with the risk of
excessive fines, Segerson also proposed to supplement ambient taxes with a lump
sum subsidy which ensures that the correct group of users remain in production.
22.2.2.3 Payment
The payment approach assumes that water demand can be curved downwards by
subsidies which reduce the profitability of activities using a lot of water. The
instrument can be implemented even in the absence of accurate information on
water use, since the payment is based on observable characteristics (crop choice or
irrigation equipments) that are assumed to be strongly linked with groundwater use.
This approach has been implemented in Europe where farmers agreeing to stop
irrigation are granted significant subsidies during a 5-year period in order to
reorganize their farm for rainfed crops. The payment can be offered on an individ-
ual basis or made dependent on collective change, for instance in terms of irrigation
practices by all farmers in a specific groundwater recharge area. The payment is
generally part of a contract signed between the regulator and one or several
groundwater users (Salzman 2005). The main difficulty of such an instrument lies
in its sustainability: funds must be provided and once subsidies are stopped, farmers
may once again increase their water consumption to maintain their income.
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22.2.2.4 Tradable Abstraction Water Rights
Appropriation is a fourth approach. It assumes that the distribution of individual or
collective property rights may support the development of rules and associated
micro-institutions (Me´nard 2003) to enforce those rights by local communities
(in particular in the case of collective appropriation); the main assumption is that
this local regulation will facilitate coordination between actors and reduce transac-
tion costs. Appropriation through tradable water rights enables the development of
water markets through which water can be reallocated among users, theoretically
leading to improved water use efficiency. This policy approach is illustrated with
the US High Plains case study below.
22.2.2.5 Persuasion
Persuasion is the fifth approach. It assumes that water use can be significantly
reduced by providing users with information on the consequences of over-exploita-
tion (in particular when irreversibility occurs with implication for future
generations) and by increasing transparency on who uses what. This is supported
by recent developments in psychological research dealing with common dilemmas,
which highlight “that people are not just motivated by narrow (economic) self-
interest but that they also consider the broad implications of their decisions for
others and for the natural environment” (Van Vugt 2009).
22.3 From Command and Control to Self-Regulation: The Case
of France
The case of France is illustrative of a transition from command and control to a
decentralized groundwater management policy, where economic incentives play a
very limited role and appropriation is still resisted by policy makers and the society
in general.
22.3.1 Legal and Institutional Framework
In France, as in many other EU countries, groundwater development has occurred
in an institutional setting that imposed few if any limits on groundwater use. Until
the 1992 water law, existing regulation mainly focused on surface waters and on
objectives related to minimum in-stream flow and aquatic ecosystems protection.
Few constraints were imposed on groundwater development until the 1990s. Wells
were not always notified and authorized discharges were not complied with. A rapid
development of agricultural groundwater use ensued. Since 2000, half of the total
agricultural irrigated area in France depends on groundwater (Garin et al. 2013). In
several parts of France, this has resulted in declining water tables, with significant
impacts on dependent rivers and ecosystems.
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The situation started to evolve with the 1992 water law which strengthened the
well licensing system and imposed the use of meters. The law also established the
concept of “water scarcity zones”1 where local regulators could ban the construc-
tion of new wells and restrict pumping through allocating individual abstraction
ceilings (in volume per year). This new regulatory framework was implemented in
several groundwater basins (Fig. 22.1), the most well-known being the Beauce
aquifer in central France.
Public water utilities were given priority over other uses in water allocation.
Concerning agriculture, the allocation of individual volumes was made by govern-
mental agencies, based on environmental impact considerations, after consultation
with the Chamber of Agriculture. The State kept the sole responsibility for
enforcing water allocation, although it lacked the human and financial resources
to conduct the required controls. Conflict resolution relied fully on judicial
procedures, but court cases were often abandoned and penalties charged to
offenders were not dissuasive. Overall, this “command and control” institutional
set-up established by the 1992 law did not succeed in averting over-exploitation.
The frequency of water crises increased and temporary restrictions and even total
irrigation bans were promulgated every year in many groundwater basins.
The regulatory framework was again reformed in 2006 with the promulgation of
a new Law on Water and Aquatic Ecosystems. In aquifers considered at risk of
over-exploitation, hydrogeological studies need to be conducted to assess the total
maximum volume that can be abstracted (capping procedure). This volume (which
can be much lower than current aggregate use) must then be shared among users.
Urban water supply is still given priority. Concerning agricultural use, Groundwa-
ter User Associations2 (GWUAs) must be established locally to share the available
amount of water among farmers (Fig. 22.1). GWUAs also have the option to raise
water fees, and to implement new instruments to enforce allocation. This opens an
interesting space for testing innovative instruments, inspired from theoretical
research and from on-going experiences in other countries.
This brief historical description shows two main transformations underlying
groundwater policy reform. First, the focus is shifted from command and control
to a decentralized management approach. The State is progressively transferring
responsibilities to farmers, through the establishment of micro-institutions which
are “inserted between global rules that circumscribe the environmental context on
the one hand, and agents, organizations and contractual agreements they are tied
with on the other hand” (Me´nard 2003). Such intermediary institutions adapt
general institutional rules to effective local organizations and allow transaction
costs to be reduced. As for groundwater, it is assumed that a locally-designed
institution will be more efficient than the government at enforcing a groundwater
quota system. The second transformation relates to allocation procedures. The
1 «Zones de Re´partitions des Eaux» in French.
2 Organisme Unique de Gestion Collective (OUGC) in French.
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establishment of individual quotas can be considered as a first move towards an
appropriation approach. In theory, quotas are very far from being property rights,
since they can be reduced or even suppressed without any compensation. In
practice, administrative pumping authorizations remain attached to the land in the
case of land transactions, which implies that the land price reflects the value of the
rent attached to the water quota. Appropriation is well underway, although this is
not recognized officially.
22.3.2 Economic Instruments in Place
As shown in the previous section, groundwater allocation is mainly driven by
command and control instruments, including temporary restrictions and individual
quotas in “water scarcity zones”. And since the 1964 Water Law an abstraction tax
is also charged by Water Agencies. The main objective of this tax is not to signal
scarcity, but to raise revenues that can be used to subsidize water related projects.
The tax level is regulated by the National Parliament which sets a maximum level
for different uses (see Table 22.1). Tax levels are far too low to provide any real
incentive to reduce groundwater extraction. For instance, the average rate charged
for irrigation (traditional gravity systems excluded) is only 3.6 € per thousand cubic
meters. Although it is doubled in “water scarcity zones”, it does not signal water
scarcity. Moreover, the abstraction fee is not recovered from small water users (less
than 10,000 m3 per year). Small economic enterprises and domestic users who
directly pump groundwater are therefore exempted from the tax.
Fig. 22.1 Groundwater scarcity areas (left) and areas where Water Users associations have been
established (surface and groundwater)
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22.3.3 Issues and Problems
The main problems and policy issues in current groundwater policies are now
covered in this subsection. The first problem relates to law enforcement. Since
1997 all wells and borewells should be declared and equipped with meters. There
are however still a number of places where this does not happen. Field
investigations conducted by the authors in the Roussillon plain, Southern France,
showed that only 1 % of domestic boreholes and 40–63 % of agricultural boreholes
have been declared (Montginoul and Rinaudo 2009; Desprats et al. 2011). In that
case study area, the Chamber of Agriculture collects the information on wells from
farmers but they withhold it fearing that it can be used against them in the future.
And when wells are declared, farmers prefer continuing to pay the flat rate abstrac-
tion fee to the Water Agency rather than declaring the volumes they actually used,
even though this would clearly be favorable to them. The situation persists because
sanctions are not dissuasive, the probability of control is too low, offenders are not
systematically prosecuted (many cases are abandoned in overburdened courts), and
due to a general lack of political will.
The second problem relates to water allocation efficiency. Water quotas have
generally been granted based on records of historical use. In certain areas, like in
the Tarn et Garonne county, the “use it or lose it” rule that should theoretically
prevail in France, where water is considered as a public trust, is not applied. This
results in situations where farmers may keep control over water quotas which they
do not use, at the expense of other farmers who are queuing-up to obtain a quota
from the government agency in charge. The corollary is a progressive feeling of
private appropriation of water by farmers (and other users) who have been
benefiting from a quota for years. The value of land reflects the existence and the
magnitude of the attached water quotas, meaning that the water rent is appropriated
by the land owner. This trend reflects current administrative practices which are in
contradiction with the foundations of the 1992 and the 2006 water laws, both stating
that water is a Nation’s common heritage.
The third problem is that of perceived (un)fairness of water allocation. Many of
the farmers in various French basins contest current water allocation which they find
unfair and not equitable. They particularly contest the priority given to urban areas
Table 22.1 Maximum tax level (€/m3) on water resource extraction (applied from January 2013)
Uses
Normal rate (€/
m3)
Water scarcity zone
(€/m3)
Irrigation (except by gravitary) 0.036 0.072
Gravitary irrigation 0.005 0.01
Potable use 0.072 0.144
Industrial cooling (with more than 99 % of water
restitution)
0.005 0.01
Canal alimentation 0.0003 0.003
Other economic uses 0.054 0.108
Source: Code de l’Environnement, articles L213-14-1 et L213-10-9
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first before environment and agriculture. Another issue of controversy is around the
rules for sharing water among farmers. The grandfathering principle, advocated by
those benefiting from a quota based on historical use, is contested by other users who
would like to enter the groundwater economy. This is nicely shown by a survey on
water allocation rules conducted in five French regions, where the diversity of
positions defended by farmers on this issue can only be understood by analyzing
self-interest economic motivations jointly with ethical beliefs and values (Chap. 11).
Last but not least, groundwater policy reform is somehow blocked by lobbying
efforts made by agricultural stakeholders who try to obtain public subsidies to
construct small reservoirs as a substitute for groundwater use.
22.3.4 Options for Future Policy
In France, policy makers are at a crossroads where three different approaches can be
chosen to develop national groundwater regulation.
• Pursuing decentralization
The first policy approach consists of pursuing decentralization. It requires
strengthening the legal status and the internal capacity of newly established
GWUAs to setup and implement their own groundwater regulation. GWUAs
would become more involved in conflict resolution, for instance through
establishing a “groundwater tribunal” composed of elected farmers and govern-
ment representatives and who would arbitrate conflicts and charge penalties on
offending farmers. GWUAs would also need to design their own rules for
allocating water among their members and facilitating (monetary or
non-monetary) exchanges between their members, in search of flexibility and
efficiency. Contract-based instruments may play a significant role in
decentralized management. For instance, Figureau et al. (2015) have proposed
a “pooling agreement” through which farmers would agree to mutualize their
quotas, in search of greater flexibility. The contract is favorable to the agents as a
team relative to the standard penalty system provided that the team does not
exceed the targeted abstraction level, but unfavorable to the team if the target is
exceeded. Participating in a group remains a voluntary decision and not all
farmers are expected to engage in these types of agreements.
As shown by the abundant literature on common pool resources, the main
advantage of decentralized groundwater management is that rules are likely to be
adapted to the local context. In France, this would respond to a real demand from
farmers, as shown by the above-mentioned recent farm survey (Chap. 11) in five
very different French counties. It highlights that farmers have highly diverging
views concerning which criteria should be used to share water and how fre-
quently allocation should be revised. For instance, while fruit farmers in the west
(Tarn et Garonne) are asking for 15–20 years of water use concessions, cereal
and vegetable growers in the north (Aisne county) would like allocation to be
revised every year.
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• Strengthening administrative regulation
The second approach involves strengthening direct administrative regulation,
with systematic registration of abstraction points, the issuance of pumping
permits, and the awarding and enforcement of individual volumetric quotas.
Water quotas are granted for a duration compatible with irrigation investments
(e.g. 15 years) and have the status of concessions as practised under the Spanish
law. Beneficiaries of concessions must report detailed information to govern-
ment agencies on where they use water and for which crop, using an internet-
based geographic information system similar to what is currently required by the
Common Agriculture Policy subsidies. Automated reading meters such as those
used in the drinking water sector help solve the information problem. The
enforcement problem is dealt with by the use of sophisticated remote-sensing
technology coupled to field inspections. A fine, proportional to the excess water
used, is applied in case of non-compliance. One of the drawbacks of this policy
approach is the lack of flexibility: newcomers (young farmers) are unable to
obtain a concession until another farmer relinquishes a license – possibly
providing incentives for farmers to drill illegal wells or to engage in informal
water trading. Water use efficiency is obviously another issue. And enforcement
is likely to be problematic in a context where scarce financial resources are
allocated to government agencies in charge of water and environmental policies.
• Using incentive-based economic instruments
The third model gives more importance to incentive-based economic
instruments, which can be implemented by the State or within GWUAs. Several
tools have been proposed and tested experimentally by French economists.
– The establishment of markets where water quotas could be traded has been
advocated since the early 2000s (Strosser and Montginoul 2001) and more
recently evaluated through consultation with farmers in different regions
(Rinaudo et al. 2012, 2014). Creating markets would not require many
institutional changes if water abstraction is properly capped (as suggested
in the second approach) and they could even operate without privatizing
water, based on a concession system as currently is happening in Spain.
– Lenouvel et al. (2011) tested an instrument combining an ambient tax with a
contract. The ambient tax is indexed according to groundwater level, and it is
charged to all farmers of the area. Farmers are offered the option to sign a
contract with the GW basin agency in which they commit to provide true
information to the agency concerning the location of their wells, irrigated
fields, and volume pumped, and to facilitate the control of this information.
These farmers are exempt from the ambient tax. The information they provide
is verified using remote sensing and field inspections.
– Figureau et al. (2015) have proposed combining payments and fines. Farmers
exceeding their quota pay an increasing block fine for the extra volume
pumped. The sum of the fines collected is then shared between those farmers
who use less than their entitlement, the received amount being proportional to
the water saving effort made. This instrument, which is expected to meet
water and budget balance simultaneously, is currently being tested through
experiments with farmers.
22 Controlling Groundwater Exploitation Through Economic Instruments: Current. . . 563
22.3.5 Social Expectations
Considering a 20-year time horizon, the three paths represent alternative feasible
options, provided significant evolution of the legal framework occurs. However,
future evolution may be strongly determined by social expectations. A series of
workshops conducted with 80 farmers and 44 institutional stakeholders suggest that
there is a strong social preference for decentralized solutions and cooperative
arrangements, while economic instruments like taxes and market are strongly
rejected mainly based on ethical considerations (Figureau et al. 2015; Rinaudo
et al. 2014). Similar conclusions were reached by Montginoul and Rinaudo (2009)
from a survey conducted in southern France by Rinaudo et al. (2014). Overall,
water remains perceived as a free access good and implementing economic
instruments is considered to be a drastic shift in paradigm. Transition towards a
mature water economy will necessarily take place as climate changes and demand
increases, but this will take time.
22.4 From Command and Control to Markets: Examples
from the High Plains Aquifer, USA
22.4.1 Background on Groundwater Management in the United
States
In the United States, the connections between groundwater pumping, local
economies, and freshwater ecosystems that are fed by groundwater have been the
subject of extended study and litigation over the last decade (e.g. Hathaway 2011;
Van Kirk and Naman 2008; Scanlon et al. 2012; Gleeson and Cardiff 2013; Steward
et al. 2013). Importantly, there is no national water policy related to groundwater
use in the United States (see also Chaps. 6, 7, and 8). Instead, groundwater
regulations are often set and implemented locally and not at a state or federal
level. Changes in regulations are primarily driven by legal impositions on local
groundwater management districts, or by a desire to preserve a rural way of life for
future generations.
Common concerns about the sustainability of groundwater use may be divided
into three broad categories: concerns over aquifer depletion (Konikow 2013;
Laukaitis 2013; Steward et al. 2013; Terrell et al. 2002; Wines 2013), concerns
over damages to transboundary surface water resources resulting from surface
water-groundwater interaction (Kuwayama and Brozovic´ 2013; McCarl
et al. 1999), and concerns over damages to groundwater-dependent ecosystems
and endangered species from surface water-groundwater interaction (Van Kirk and
Naman 2008).
As a result, there is a very fine-scale heterogeneity of regulations related to
groundwater use. Whereas large portions of the United States do not have any
meaningfully binding restrictions on groundwater use, there is also a growing
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number of areas where quantification, monitoring, and enforcement of pumping
rights have been implemented. Moreover, there are also examples where markets in
groundwater pumping rights are emerging. Finally, in at least one case, voluntary
changes in water rights that allow binding reductions in agricultural groundwater
pumping have occurred (Kuwayama and Brozovic´ 2013; NE DNR and MRNRD
2010; NE DNR and TBNRD 2012; NE DNR and URNRD 2010; Thompson
et al. 2009). In the remainder of the section, we will focus on describing some of
these recent, innovative approaches to groundwater management.
22.4.2 Introduction to the High Plains Aquifer Region
The High Plains aquifer system is one of the largest groundwater aquifers in the
world (McGuire et al. 2012; Fig. 22.2). It supports endangered species, ecosystems,
and rural economies in an area covering multiple states (Gutentag et al. 1984;
Rosenberg et al. 1999; Dennehy et al. 2002) and a variety of hydrologic and
climatic settings. As a result, both the management concerns and institutional
responses to these concerns vary enormously across the region.
Each state above the High Plains aquifer has its own groundwater administration
areas. These areas are called Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) in Nebraska,
Groundwater Management Districts (GMDs) in Kansas, and Groundwater Conser-
vation Districts (GCDs) in Texas. All three categories of groundwater-related
conflict discussed in the previous section are observed in the High Plains
(Fig. 22.2). First, the major concern over groundwater may be related to declining
well yields as pumping reduces saturated thicknesses (e.g. Northwest Kansas
GMD#4, North Plains GCD). Second, stream depletion related to groundwater
pumping may lead to conflict between groundwater users and downstream surface
water users (e.g. the Upper and Middle Republican NRDs, Big Bend GMD#5).
Finally, stream depletion may negatively impact endangered species and instream
habitat (e.g. the Twin and Central Platte NRDs).
Effective groundwater management requires monitoring and enforcement of
groundwater use. In the High Plains region, a large portion of the states of Kansas
and Nebraska requires that all irrigation wells are metered and pumping reported
annually. Meters are less common in Texas, but some groundwater management
districts such as the North Plains Groundwater Conservation District are now
phasing-in meter installation.
As noted above, monitoring of groundwater use is only meaningful to resource
management to the extent that there is enforcement when violations occur. Where
reporting of metering data is voluntary and without sanction, there is little incentive
to provide timely or accurate readings. Conversely, in some groundwater manage-
ment districts, paid district employees do the meter reading, with fines for broken
meters and severe penalties for violators. For example, in 2010, the Upper Repub-
lican Natural Resources District in Nebraska revoked groundwater pumping rights,
estimated to be worth in excess of $3 million, for several groundwater users who
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had attempted to increase their water use illegally through bypassing their well flow
meters.
Note that even without metering of groundwater use, it is possible to estimate
groundwater use, and depending on the situation, imperfect monitoring may be
sufficient for management. For example, some natural resources districts in
Nebraska quantify and enforce the right to irrigate a certain area of land, but do
not meter water use (e.g. the Twin Platte and Central Platte NRDs). If crop water
demands on a per-area basis are similar, then the estimation error from not metering
may be small. Thus, depending on the goals of groundwater management, it may be
Fig. 22.2 High Plains Aquifer region, with key administrative areas in Kansas, Nebraska, and
Texas
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preferable to avoid the potential difficulties associated with metering. However,
there is still a need to enforce limits on the irrigated areas for such systems to
succeed.
22.4.3 Transferable Schemes for Groundwater Pumping Rights
Policies that seek to reallocate groundwater pumping rights must deal with a
number of issues. While some of these are well-known from markets for surface
water rights (Chong and Sunding 2006; Saliba 1987; Young 1986), others are
specific to groundwater pumping. Groundwater pumping leads to several kinds of
spatial and intertemporal externalities (Brozovic´ et al. 2010; Kuwayama and
Brozovic´ 2013). Indeed, groundwater management schemes that reallocate water
between alternate pumping locations are often explicitly designed to change the
distribution and magnitude of pumping externalities. Reallocation may be designed
to minimize unwanted impacts on third parties or to encourage trades that reduce
the magnitude of externalities (Palazzo and Brozovic´ 2014; Brozovic´ and Young
2014).
Externalities arising from groundwater pumping depend on local hydrologic
properties and are spatial and intertemporal (Brozovic´ et al. 2010). In principle
groundwater pumping produces well interference and induces drawdown in adja-
cent wells. However, to date interference between adjacent wells with different
ownership has not obviously restricted groundwater trading in the High Plains
region. One possible explanation is that existing well spacing regulations are
enough to prevent significant well interference between adjacent wells. Because
trading of the right to pump groundwater changes the location of pumping but does
not involve the physical transfer of water above ground, in general no water
conveyance system is needed. Note that this is different to most surface water
markets, where the need for water conveyance may be a major limitation to trading.
Moreover, in groundwater management areas where there are already binding
restrictions on groundwater use, water users that are looking to purchase additional
pumping rights often have excess pumping capacity and may be able to use any
permits they purchase without needing any further capital investment.
Existing groundwater permit trading schemes typically use applied water, rather
than consumptive water use, as the unit of trade. Again this is in contrast to surface
water markets, where it is common for only consumptive water use to be tradable.
The main reason for the difference is likely pragmatic. Well metering quantifies
applied water rather than consumptive use and represents a unit of transfer that is
politically acceptable to water user groups. Moreover, in many cases both buyers
and sellers of groundwater use rights have the same irrigation technology (typically
centre pivot systems in the High Plains region of the United States). Consequently,
differences in consumptive use between buyers and sellers may be negligible.
Conversely, in surface water markets where water is moved outside of basins, or
between agricultural and urban water users, the need to quantify consumptive use is
much greater.
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22.4.4 Innovations in Groundwater Management: Nebraska
Management of groundwater in Nebraska is undertaken by Natural Resources
Districts (NRDs). The NRDs are operated as local government agencies but may
be thought of as large groundwater user associations. The NRDs have a relatively
large amount of autonomy, and determine their rules and regulations in consultation
at the state level through the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources. As a
result, a wide variety of groundwater management institutions have evolved at an
NRD level, reflecting local concerns about water use (Fig. 22.2). For example, (NE
DNR and MRNRD 2010; NE DNR and TBNRD 2012; NE DNR and URNRD
2010) in the Platte River Basin in Nebraska, groundwater regulation is driven by
stream depletion impacting endangered species habit for fish and migratory birds
(Fig. 22.2). There is currently no metering of wells in the NRDs within the Platte
River Basin. The Twin Platte, Central Platte, and Tri-Basin (Platte River portion)
NRDs currently allow transfers of groundwater pumping rights. Each of these
NRDs uses certification of irrigated acres to place an upper bound on the land
area that can be irrigated. Then, transfers of certified irrigated acreage are allowed.
Stream depletion is calculated over a 50-year horizon and, depending on the NRD,
transfers may be adjusted if acreage is transferred to a location with higher stream
depletion than the original location. There are also additional spatial limits on
trading, such as constraints that trades cannot move water upstream (Twin Platte
and Central Platte NRDs) or outside of specified zones (Tri-Basin NRD). Note that
the use of certified irrigated acres as the unit of transfer corresponds to an imperfect
monitoring of groundwater pumping. However, when the primary concern is stream
depletion, encouraging trading to move water further from the river is desirable and,
over short to medium management timescales, the benefits of this spatial realloca-
tion may outweigh modest increases in total pumping.
Conversely, groundwater regulation in the Republican River Basin of Nebraska
has been driven by interstate litigation between Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado
over the allocations of surface water to each state from the Republican River
(McKusick 2002; Figure 2). As a result of a long litigation between the states, all
wells in the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin are metered, with
mandatory annual reporting and moratoria on new wells. The Upper Republican
NRD completed metering in 1982, and the remaining NRDs completed metering in
2005. There are pumping quotas in place with complex and changing intertemporal
carry forward provisions that allow banking of unused rights for future use. Current
updates of the integrated management plans for three of the NRDs in the Republi-
can River Basin, the Upper (UR) and Middle (MR) Republican and Tri-Basin
(TB) (Republican River portion) NRDs, allow for some trading of groundwater
pumping rights.
The Republican River Basin NRDs that allow trading each have slightly differ-
ent rules that constrain trading. For example, in the Upper Republican NRD, trades
must stay within an area equal in size to a township (36 mile2 or around 90 km2). In
the Middle Republican NRD, trading is limited to groundwater users within certain
distances from streams. In years in which the Middle Republican NRD is concerned
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about meeting its stream depletion targets under the Republican River Compact,
trading may be suspended at the discretion of the NRD. In each of the NRDs, there
is an adjustment for differences in stream depletion if pumping rights are trans-
ferred to a location where stream depletion is greater than the original pumping
location. However, if pumping rights are transferred to a location with lower stream
depletion than the original location, no adjustment to the rights takes place.
22.4.5 Innovations in Groundwater Management: Kansas
Kansas is unusual in having appropriative, rather than correlative, rights for
groundwater. This complicates any policy that seeks to reallocate groundwater
pumping between users as any transfer must not demonstrably impact any senior
rights holders. Thus, it is possible that concerns over well interference might restrict
the potential applicability of groundwater trading schemes. Despite this, ground-
water trading has been established in two areas of the state. First in the Big Bend
Groundwater Management District (GMD) No. 5, the Wet Walnut Creek Intensive
Groundwater Use Control Area is metered with pumping allocations, and transfers
are allowed, though they have not yet occurred. GMD No. 5 also operates a
groundwater bank through which transfers may occur, subject to large conservation
offsets and regulatory complexity. One trade has occurred in the bank.
Second, in the Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4, a
portion of the district (the Sheridan-6 area) was designated a Local Enhanced
Management Area (LEMA) in early 2013. This is the first such area in the state.
The LEMA is self-regulating, and has chosen to equalize the seniority of its water
rights and reduce the total water allocation by 20 % relative to historic use. Trading
is allowed and will be on a volumetric basis without adjustment, as the primary
concern is aquifer depletion and not stream depletion.
22.4.6 Innovations in Groundwater Management: Texas
Although metering is slowly being introduced to groundwater conservation districts
in Texas, conveyance is an impediment to trading in Texas. Under current ground-
water law, trading is allowed but the buyer is expected to pump the water at the
location of purchase, on the seller’s land. Portions of land overlying the Edwards
Aquifer (not a part of the High Plains Aquifer) are an exception to this rule, where
trading is allowed to change the location of pumping as it is assumed that the area
encompassing all potential transfers is small enough that impacts on third parties
will not be altered significantly by transfers. The Edwards Aquifer Authority in
Texas has implemented well permitting and metering programs and allows transfers
of the right to pump up to 1 acre-foot/acre of certified irrigated land (EAA 2012).
Both permanent transfer and lease markets exist.
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22.5 From Command and Control to Markets: Examples from
Chile
The case of Chile is illustrative of a transition from command and control to market
based groundwater management policy, where economic incentives play a signifi-
cant role in allocation of water use rights.
22.5.1 Legal and Institutional Framework (an Historical Perspective
and Recent Evolution)
The first Chilean text to regulate the use of water is an 1819 Executive Decree
which defined the dimensions of an irrigation water use right and responsibility for
water intakes. The 1855 Civil Code was the first legal instrument to define that “the
rivers and all waters running within natural channels are national goods of public
use.” In addition, it establishes that access to water is obtained by means of water-
use rights (WUR) “granted by the competent authority.” The concept of WUR was
further developed in the 1930 Water Code proposal and 1951 Water Code. The
latter code defines WUR as follows: “A water use right is an actual right that falls on
publicly owned waters which consists in the use, possession and disposal of such
waters fulfilling the requirements and in accordance with the rules prescribed
herein” (Hearne and Donoso 2005). The 1967 Water Code, implemented in a
more centralized political context, reinforces the concept of water as being within
the public domain and changed the legal nature of WUR, stressing that these were
administrative rights where the State grants the use of the waters, subject to public
regulation. These WUR could expire, and the process of water reallocation was to
be based on regional water-use plans executed by means of studies that determined
the rate of rational and beneficial use (Hearne and Donoso 2005).
The Water Code of 1981 (WC 1981) maintained water as “national goods of
public use,” but granted permanent, transferable WUR to individuals so as to reach
an efficient allocation of the resource through market transactions of WUR. The
holder of the WUR is the owner of the right in perpetuity, ownership that is
protected constitutionally. However, it is important to note that granted WUR do
not constitute a transfer of ownership of the water. The WC 1981 allowed for
freedom in the use of water to which an agent has WUR; thus, WUR are not sector
specific and can be transferred between sectors as well as within economic sectors.
Similarly, the WC 1981 abolishes the water use preferential lists, present in the
Water Codes of 1951 and 1967. Additionally, WUR do not expire and do not
consider a “use it or lose it” clause.
The WC 1981 specifies consumptive and non-consumptive WUR for both
surface and groundwater. Non-consumptive use rights allow the owner to divert
water with the obligation to return the same water unaltered to its original source.
Consumptive use rights do not require that the water be returned once it has been
used. Consumptive and non-consumptive WUR are, by law, specified as a volume
per unit of time. In addition, consumptive and non-consumptive rights can be
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exercised in a permanent or contingent manner and in a continuous, discontinuous
or alternating mode. Permanent use rights are rights specified as a volume per unit
of time, unless there is water scarcity in which these WUR are recognized as shares
of water flows. Contingent rights are specified as a volume per unit of time and only
authorize the user to extract water once permanent rights have extracted their rights.
Continuous rights are those use rights that allow users to extract water continually
over time. On the other hand, discontinuous rights are those that only permit water
to be extracted at given periods. Finally, alternating rights are those in which water
extraction is distributed among two or more persons.
Groundwater in Chile is regulated in Book I, Title VI of the WC 1981 in Articles
58–68. In addition, groundwater is administratively regulated by Resolution
No. 425 of the Direccion General de Aguas (DGA – General Water Directory)
approved in 2008. Article 58 establishes that any person can explore in order to find
groundwater on their property. Exploration on public property requires an authori-
zation by the DGA; should two or more petitions for exploration be presented for
the same geographic area, the DGA will define who receives the exploration right
based on an auction. If groundwater is found, the user can petition the DGA for a
new groundwater use right. The groundwater use right petition must meet the
following requirements:
(a) Identification of the aquifer from which the water is to be extracted;
(b) Definition of the quantity of water to be extracted, expressed in liters per
second;
(c) Yield and depth of the extraction well;
(d) Specification of the water extraction points and the method of extraction; and
(e) Definition of whether the right is permanent or contingent, continuous, dis-
continuous or alternating.
The administrative procedure requires that this WUR petition be published in the
Diario Oficial, in a daily Santiago newspaper, and in a regional newspaper, where
applicable. Previous to the WC 1981 reform of 2005, the DGA could not refuse to
grant new water rights without infringing a constitutional guarantee, provided there
was technical evidence of the availability of water resources and that the new use
would not harm existent rights holders.3 At present, if the petition is found to be for
speculative reasons the DGA can refuse to grant the solicited WUR. If there is
competition for solicited water rights, they are to be allocated through an auction
with an award to the highest bidder. This allocation rule between competing WUR
petitioners allows water to be allocated to its highest use value.
The Law No. 20,017 of 2005 amended the procedure to grant new WUR of the
WC 1981 and introduced a non-use tariff (patente de no-uso). Due to the difficulties
of monitoring the effective use of all WUR, the non-use tariff is applied to all
3 But, the DGA can declare certain aquifers to be fully exploited and refuse to grant new
groundwater use rights.
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consumptive permanent groundwater WUR that do not count with water intake
infrastructure, and to all non-consumptive WUR that do not have water intake and
return infrastructure (Law No. 20,017 of 2005, art. 129 bis 4-6).
Groundwater resources can be classified as: free, under restriction, and under
prohibition. A groundwater resource classified as free implies that newWUR can be
granted to petitioners. Groundwater declared under restriction4 only allows provi-
sional WUR to be granted; meanwhile, if it is under prohibition,5 no new WUR can
be granted.6 In Chile, the possibility of limiting withdrawals has been contemplated
since 1983 (Res DGA 207 of 1983). However, this resolution does not indicate how
these restricted groundwater resources were to be managed. DGA Res 186, which
establishes that groundwater user communities (GUC) will manage restricted
groundwater resources, clarifies this in 1996; additionally, DGARes 186 establishes
that all restricted groundwater resources must have a GUC. At present Res 341 of
2005, Article 63 of the WC 1981, and Article 39 of Resolution 425 of the DGA
establishes that GUC are responsible for the management of groundwater resources
and of water extractions.
Approximately 70 % of Chilean territory presents no restrictions for groundwa-
ter exploitation. There are at least 50 aquifers with a declaration of restriction, all
located from the Region of Arica and Parinacota to O’Higgins (Fig. 22.3). There are
only two aquifers under prohibition: the first is the aquifer of San Jose´ de Azapa in
the Region of Arica and Parinacota and the second is the aquifer of Copiapo in the
Atacama Region. Even though there could be over 50 GUC, only two GUC exist at
present in Chile; one manages groundwater in the restricted aquifer of Copiapo
Province and the second one can be found in the Yali sector of the Melipilla
Province of the Metropolitan Region.
22.5.2 Economic Mechanisms/Instruments in Place
The WC 1981 established that WUR are transferable in order to facilitate WUR
markets as an allocation mechanism. Although private water use rights existed in
Chile prior to 1981, the previous water codes restricted the creation and operation of
efficient water markets. The framers of the 1981 Water Code sought to achieve the
efficiencies of market reallocation of water, “the objective of the governmental
4 The DGA can declare an aquifer under restriction if there is a risk of negative impacts of new
WUR on existing WURs.
5 The DGA can declare an aquifer under prohibition if there is clear evidence of a risk of resource
depletion due to over-extraction.
6 The DGA has the authority to provisionally grant groundwater use rights in those areas that have
been declared under restriction. The effects of these provisional WUR on other groundwater use
rights holders are studied. Should negative impacts be identified in these areas, these provisional
WUR are anulled by the DGA; i.e. groundwater may no longer be extracted with these WUR.
However, if no effects are identified after 5 years of water extraction, these provisional WUR can
become definite WUR.
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Fig. 22.3 Map of Chile showing different regions
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action in this field was to create solid WUR in order to facilitate the proper
operation of the market as an allocation mechanism” (Buchi 1993, pp. 85–87).
Thus the WC 1981 was designed to protect traditional and customary WUR and to
foster economically beneficial reallocation through market transfers (Bauer 2004;
Buchi 1993; Hearne and Donoso 2005).
Although market reallocation of water has not been common throughout most of
Chile, the existence of water markets has been documented. As Donoso (2012)
concludes, studies have shown active trading for WUR in the Copiapo aquifer
where water is scarce with a high economic value, especially for the mining sector
and the high valued agricultural export sector (CNR 2012). Inter-sectoral trading
has transferred water to growing urban areas in the Elqui Valley (Hearne and Easter
1997) and the upper Mapocho watershed, where water companies and real estate
developers are continuously buying water and account for 76 % of the rights traded
during the 1993–1999 period (Donoso et al. 2002). Other studies have shown
limited trading in the Bı´o Bı´o, Aconcagua, and Cachapoal Valleys (Bauer 1998;
Hadjigeorgalis and Riquelme 2002).
A key conclusion of these studies is that water markets are driven by demand
from relatively high-valued water uses, and facilitated by low transactions costs in
those aquifers that the DGA has declared as restricted or protected and where there
are GUCs present that assist in the transfer of water. For example as Fig. 22.4
shows, in the Copiapo basin, the volume of water and number of WUR traded began
to increase as of 1994, when the DGA declared the aquifer under protection (CNR
2012). There was a second increase as of 2002 when the DGA maintained the
prohibition for Sectors 1–4 and declared restrictions for Sectors 5 and 6. This
resolution reinforced the signal to water users that new WUR were not available
for the Copiapo aquifer and, thus new water demands must be satisfied through the
market for WUR.
In the absence of these conditions, trading has been rare and water markets have
not become institutionalized in most aquifers. It should be noted that during the
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2000s, the market was more active than in the previous two decades, that is in the
1980s and 1990s (Donoso 2012).
22.5.3 Issues and Problems
The WC 1981 did not pay much attention to the sustainable management of
groundwater because at that time groundwater extraction was marginal during the
early 1980s. Recognizing the need to improve groundwater management regulation
due to increased groundwater pumping, the 2005 amendment of the WC 1981
introduced procedures to reach a sustainable management of underground water
resources. The main provisions are: (a) extraction restrictions when third parties are
affected; (b) authorization for the DGA to impose the installation of extraction
measurement equipment in order to monitor extractions effectively; (c) the estab-
lishment of areas subject to extraction prohibitions and restrictions; and (d) the need
to consider the interaction between surface water and groundwater when analyzing
petitions for new surface or groundwater WUR.
However, a World Bank study (2011) concluded that there exist various
problems associated with groundwater management. A major concern is the general
lack of information about groundwater and insufficient knowledge about its dynam-
ics, in particular its interaction with surface waters. There are significant gaps in the
registry of wells, extraction and quality measurements, recharge balances, and
identification of pollution sources. In general, information systems are not linked
to the measurement and monitoring of aquifers to estimate groundwater
withdrawals. An effective information system is a prerequisite to be able to control
and sustainably manage an aquifer.
The sustainability of northern aquifers is compromised due to the over-provision
of WUR related to the practice of allocating WUR based on foreseeable use. The
foreseeable use considers the probable effective water extraction of different
sectors when analyzing whether there is sufficient water to grant new WUR. For
example, an agricultural WUR does not extract water in winter months, whereas a
mining WUR extracts water all year round. In this case, the authority would
consider a lower pressure on water resources of an agricultural WUR with respect
to the pressure of a mining WUR. This practice commits the mistake of not
considering the transferable nature of WUR. Thus, when water scarcity increases
and inter-sectoral WUR transactions increase, water resources will be
overexploited and unsustainable. Additionally, the over-provision of WUR gave
rise to increased water conflicts as WUR are transferred to users with a more
intensive water use, such as from agriculture to mining in the northern basins.
An additional challenge for a sustainable groundwater management is the fact
that at present ground and surface waters are managed independently despite their
recognized interrelations even though the 2005 reform of the WC 1981 establishes
that surface and groundwater must be jointly managed. This implies that at present
there is no conjunctive management of surface and groundwater, which has proven
to be an effective adaptation mechanism for climate change.
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There are, in general, no GUCs that manage groundwater user rights; the only
exception is in some sections of the over-exploited Copiapo aquifer. There should
exist a GUC at least for all aquifers that have a restriction or prohibition declaration
by the DGA. The fact that users have not yet organized themselves in GUCs to take
over the management of groundwater reflects the lack of understanding of a large
proportion of users of the long term effects that uncontrolled exploitation of
aquifers may cause. In the absence of GUCs, the WC 1981 establishes that the
DGA is responsible for controlling and monitoring groundwater withdrawals.
Evidence has shown that the DGA does not have the necessary resources (human,
technical, and financial) to monitor all groundwater extractions.
There is an incentive for the adoption of water saving technologies by farmers
(Law No. 18,450). This program subsidizes small scale, private irrigation
investments. It has supported much of the installation of drip irrigation systems in
the dry north and spray systems in the humid south. However, there has been no
assessment of the impacts of this incentive instrument on groundwater recharge and
sustainability. Hence, it is essential to strengthen the coordination between sectoral
policies and water management policies.
22.6 Conclusions
One of the lessons learnt from the three case studies is that policies implemented in
practice often combine instruments which text books often present as competing
options. In Chile, France and the High Plain case studies, policy makers and local
managers are actually trying to combine (i) instruments which provide economic
incentives and allow for reallocating water with (ii) the development of water user
associations and, to some extent, (iii) the formalization of water (use) rights. There
is nothing in reality that looks like a pure “market” approach.
Another key lesson is that monitoring and control remains an issue in the three
very different contexts, even where full property rights have been established for
decades. It is also interesting to note that solutions implemented to solve informa-
tion problems are somewhat the same in the different countries – all assume that
perfect information on water abstraction (e.g. metering) is not a prerequisite and
that management can work with less precise information such as a measurement of
irrigated area for instance.
A third lesson is that economic instruments enter the management tool box only
when water scarcity becomes a real problem or, to use Randall’s terminology, when
the water economy matures. The High Plain case study shows that different
“maturity” levels may co-exist in the same State. Put differently, this implies that
the choice of economic instruments that can be used in each specific situation is far
from being fully determined by the national legal, institutional, societal and eco-
nomic framework. Therefore there is probably plenty of room for manoeuvre for
local stakeholders to explore the potential for innovative approaches.
Table 22.2 synthesizes the main characteristics of groundwater management in
the three case studies. It highlights that incentive-based instruments are framed
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Table 22.2 Comparison of groundwater management in the three case studies
Chile France USA – high plains aquifer
Level of
aquifer
regulation
A national policy locally
translated
A national policy
locally translated
No federal policy
regulation. May be some
state oversight.
Groundwater regulation at
local level, which can
differ from one State to
another
Groundwater
areas
Free (70 % of aquifers),
under restriction (~50
aquifers), under
prohibition (2 aquifers)
89 % of aquifers
reputed in good
status (Vial
et al. 2010)
Most aquifers with no
restrictions, but a growing
number of active
management areas
Three types of problems:
aquifer depletion,
damages to transboundary
surface water resources or
to ecosystems
Water rights Ancient (1855) water-use
rights –WUR- based on
maximal consumptive
levels. Constitutionally
protected. No “use it or
lose it” clause
No water right.
Only yearly and
revocable water
abstraction
authorizations.
Presently,
definition of an
upper limit to
water abstraction
per groundwater
basin to be shared
between users
Generally no or very few
limits on groundwater use.
In some regions, water
rights defined with or
without water meters.
Kansas: appropriative
rights; other States:
generally correlative
rights
Groundwater
withdrawals’
management
Water markets authorized
since 1981. Active only in
scarcity areas, when there
exist high-valued water
uses and low transactions
costs
A fee paid to
Water Agency.
Creation of water
users’ associations
charged to share
global water
quota. No water
market
A variety of mechanisms
including no restrictions,
well moratoria, limits on
irrigated acreage, limits
on pumping, water
markets
Water users’
associations
Compulsory in scarcity
areas since 1983
Compulsory in
scarcity areas
since 2014
Yes, in some areas
Problems No conjunctive ground
and surface water
management and more
generally no coordination
between sectoral policies
Lack of information on
groundwater dynamics
Few WUA (2) and lack of
monitoring in other cases
Water markets lead an
unsustainable increase of
water consumption
Levels of water
fees not incentive
Law enforcement
Water allocation
efficiency
A perceived unfair
allocation
Generally there are few
restrictions on
groundwater use
Generally, no conjunctive
ground and surface water
management
Extended litigation is
often a prerequisite for
management changes
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taking into account local contexts, in particular historical, institutional and cultural
aspects. Where groundwater was traditionally considered as an open access
resource, introducing regulations represents a shift in paradigm and is likely to
raise significant opposition. Moreover, the level of involvement of users in the
definition of groundwater sharing rules is key to understanding the type of instru-
ment chosen and its efficiency. All these aspects explain the current institutions for
groundwater management that have developed in the three case studies: the external
imposition of water markets in Chile which do not function as expected, a manage-
ment mostly based on quantitative sharing in France (with few economic
instruments), and nascent market instruments in the High Plains Aquifer of the
United States.
To conclude, economic instruments are used to encourage groundwater users to
adopt water saving behaviours and then to not overexploit groundwater resources
while maximising water efficiency. However, using economic instruments for
groundwater management is challenging due to the nature of the resource: it is
often complicated to define satisfactorily the level of abstraction that allows a
sustainable exploitation; it is also difficult to detect groundwater usage, especially
where surface water can also be used. Together, this explains why economic
instruments sometimes do not function as anticipated because of incomplete
information.
Apart from such difficulties, the three case studies point out two main challenges
to be able to control groundwater over-exploitation through economic instruments.
First of all is the acceptability challenge. For instance, in France, water markets are
nowadays not acceptable mainly for ethical reasons; water taxes can also be
rejected, a taxable user finding unfair such an instrument which is seen to unduly
increase State receipts. Similarly, over most of the United States, restrictions on
groundwater use are currently not acceptable to key user groups. The second
challenge is enforcement. An example is given by the Chile case where an enforce-
able property rights’ system combined with an appropriate information level of
groundwater availability and demand is still lacking; in France, sanctions applica-
ble in respect of non-registered withdrawals are sometimes not applied. Threats
cannot be credible, and then an instrument based on them will not function at all.
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